

## Türkiye-European Union Relations In The Framework Of Common Foreign and Security Policy: Identity and Security<sup>1</sup>

Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası Çerçevesinde Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri: Kimlik ve Güvenlik

**Aykut Karakuş / Res. Asst. Dr.** 

Istanbul Beykent University, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences,  
aykutkarakus@beykent.edu.tr

**Halis Ayhan / Assoc. Prof. Dr.** 

Kırıkkale University, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences  
halisayhan@kku.edu.tr

### Abstract

After the Cold War, Türkiye was called a security-consuming actor due to its closeness to conflict zones, terror trouble and its with neighbors territory issues. Both these reasons and the identity-based security approaches of European Union (EU) member states have: it also created reasons for Türkiye's exception from Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and EU. Subsequently, Russia's intervention to Georgia, Arab Spring, migration and humanistic crises, the annexation of Crimea, Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and the occupation of Ukraine have threatened the global and regional security. Against these threats, Türkiye has contributed to security by taking on a mediator role in the Russian and Ukrainian crises, initiating initiatives to ensure food and energy security, taking the lead in the migration and refugee crisis, and participating in UN, NATO and EU operations. However, these contributions were overshadowed by the opposition of Greece and the Rum Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus to Türkiye within the Union. Although Türkiye was an actor producing security after 2010, it was criticized in the 2022 Strategic Compass Document. In this manner, both evolving security approaches and current developments; Its requires examining and reanalyzing the relations Türkiye-EU, focusing on security.

**Keywords:** Energy Security, Security Approaches, CFSP, The Strategic Compass, Turkish Foreign Policy.

**JEL Codes:** 00, H56, N70

### Özet

Soğuk Savaş sonrası Türkiye, çatışma bölgelerine yakınlığı, terör sorunu ve komşuları ile yaşadığı ülkesel sorunlar nedeniyle güvenlik tüketen bir aktör olarak adlandırılmıştır. Hem bu nedenler hem de Avrupa Birliği (AB) üye devletlerinin kimliksel güvenlik yaklaşımları; Türkiye'nin Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası (ODGP) ve AB'den dışlanmasına da gerekçe oluşturmuştur. Sonrasında Rusya'nın Gürcistan müdahalesi, Arap Baharı, göç ve insani krizler, Kırım'ın ilhaki, Brexit, Koronavirüs salgını ve Ukrayna'nın işgali; küresel ve bölgesel güvenliği tehdit etmiştir. Bu tehditlere karşı Türkiye, Rusya ve Ukrayna krizinde arabulucu rol üstlenerek, gıda ve enerji güvenliğinin sağlanması için girişimler başlatarak, göç ve mülteci krizinde inisiyatif alarak, BM, NATO ve AB operasyonlarına dâhil olarak güvenliğe katkı sunmuştur. Ancak bu katkılar Yunanistan ve Güney Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi'nin Birlik içindeki Türkiye karşıtlığının gölgesinde kalmıştır. Türkiye 2010 sonrası güvenlik üreten bir aktör olmasına rağmen 2022 Stratejik Pusula Belgesi'nde eleştirilmiştir. Bu minvalde hem değişen güvenlik yaklaşımları hem de güncel gelişmeler; güvenliği odağa alarak Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin incelenmesini ve yeniden analiz edilmesini gerektirmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Enerji Güvenliği, Güvenlik Yaklaşımları, ODGP, Stratejik Pusula, Türk Dış Politikası.

**JEL Kodları:** 00, H56, N70

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## Introduction

Türkiye, with 5% of its territory located in Thrace, is both a Balkan and a European state (Oran, 2010, p. 623). Therefore, Türkiye is an important strategic partner for the EU and its security, both in terms of its geopolitical and geocultural identity as well as its military and power capacity. At the same time, as a state with a liberal and democratic identity, Türkiye shares relatively common interests and needs with European states. Especially, Russia's military intervention in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and the invasion of Ukraine have triggered crises, especially in food and energy supply security, as well as migration and refugee issues. As a result, this situation has increased the need for Türkiye in ensuring European security.

With the end of the bipolar system and the perceived threats from the Eastern Bloc, identity issues emerged at both the state and system levels. This situation has led state-level actors, including NATO, to engage in a process of re-constructing their identities. For Türkiye, perceiving itself as having lost significance after the Cold War, this transformation process has produced both new opportunities and certain limitations. Türkiye has sought to overcome this relative sense of isolation by recognizing newly independent Turkic states and establishing good relations with Balkan countries. However, the wars and conflicts occurring in the Balkans and the Middle East have increased the security concerns for Türkiye and the EU. Indeed, the statement "Türkiye's security interests begin in Bosnia" after the conflicts in the Balkans describes a symbiotic relationship between the two actors in the context of security.

The end of the bipolar system, the increased influence of non-state actors in decision-making processes, changes in security perception paradigms,<sup>2</sup> the inability of states to combat threats independently, and the impact of asymmetric power/threat elements have all contributed to a transformation in the security relations between the EU, which aspires to be a global security actor, and Türkiye, which exceeds regional actor capacity. Indeed, Türkiye, which acted as a mediator among the parties in the conflicts in the Balkans, also provided effective support to UN and NATO operations. However, after 1992, Türkiye was excluded from the integration of the Western European Union (WEU) and the institutionalization process of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). At the same time, the fact that the WEU

would utilize NATO's capabilities and resources raised some reservations and concerns for Türkiye. Despite these concerns, Türkiye was also excluded from the ESDP process, which represents the integration of the WEU into the EU. Its concerns were not alleviated until the Feira Summit. After the Lisbon Treaty, which restructured the ESDP into the Common Security and Defense Policy, Türkiye's contributions to European security were overlooked. Its contributions to global and regional security were overshadowed by identity-based approaches and the populist stances of actors such as Greece, the Rum Administration of Southern Cyprus (RASC), and France. Indeed, this attitude is reflected in the 2003, 2008, and 2016 Strategy Documents, as well as the 2022 Strategic Compass, where Türkiye's candidate status for EU membership is not mentioned, and its security contributions are implied to be consumed.

Although, following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, narratives suggesting that Türkiye did not produce security and had lost its importance for the West became prominent, Türkiye, which adopted an active foreign policy as a conflict-resolution actor after 2010, has reached a level where it produces security and contributes to peace and stability in European security. In this context, the increasing migration to the EU, the instability resulting from regional crises, the expansion of the security dimension,<sup>3</sup> energy supply security, climate change, and pandemics being viewed as new threats have all enhanced Türkiye's geopolitical, economic, and strategic importance. At the same time, Türkiye's liberal and democratic state identity has facilitated the deepening of bilateral relations and the adoption of common interests in the EU's search for potential security collaborations. Especially with recent developments, Türkiye's role as a mediator in regional issues, along with its military capacity, success in combating terrorism, and liberal state identity, highlights the security dimension in EU-Türkiye relations. However, Türkiye's humanitarian approach and emphasis on mutual dialogue in addressing issues within the Mediterranean hinterland have been interpreted differently by the West, particularly by EU member states.

In summary, Türkiye's membership in NATO, the UN, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), along with its developing military capabilities, liberal and democratic state identity, and effective use of both soft and hard power tools, continue to contribute to international peace and

<sup>2</sup> The transformation of the traditional security perception based on the distinction between high and low politics.

<sup>3</sup> Individual, climate, environment, economy, energy, food security, etc.

stability. These factors also complicate the achievement of a Europe-wide security framework independent of Türkiye.

Ultimately, the European Security Strategy Documents, along with the new threat classifications and current developments<sup>4</sup> make it essential to examine and reanalyze Türkiye-EU relations with a focus on security. In the study, with the assumption that Türkiye, characterized as a security-consuming actor, has become a security-producing actor post-2010, security is taken as the focal point. An analytical-explanatory method is employed to analyze Türkiye-EU relations chronologically. In this context, the relationship between security and identity is examined from a theoretical perspective, utilizing case studies and data that test the assumption.

### Security, Identity and New Threats: Theoretical Framework

Accepted as date of the emergence of modern nation state from 1648's to today, Security is among the primary agenda of states and non-state actors. However, within the discipline of international relations, there is no definitive definition of what security fully encompasses or what it precisely is. Additionally, there are ongoing institutional debates regarding which issues should be included within the scope of security. In this context, the functionality of both traditional and modern security approaches in foreign policy, as well as in how actors perceive each other, is noteworthy. However, in foreign policy analyzes conducted at the state level, it is seen that the notion of identity and abstract elements (such as religion and culture), which were ignored during the Cold War, gradually gain meaning and direct the state's perception of security and threat behavior. Ultimately, these elements also have an impact on Türkiye and the EU relations and are decisive in the threat, interest, purpose and foreign policy quadrant.

The "First Great Debate" between liberalism and realism provides insight into how the concept of security was perceived during that period. These debates form the foundation of the traditional security approach. However, when examining these approaches, it is important not to overlook the role of the international system in the emergence of the traditional security approach, which was not only a determining factor but also acted as a catalyst. Indeed, while it was possible to understand and analyze inter-bloc relations during the rigid bipolar system, dominated by the two major powers, the USA and the USSR, using the traditional security approach, it becomes more challenging to base inter-state re-

lations on this approach in the post-Cold War era, characterized by a multipolar and unipolar system.

Realist theorists view the state of insecurity in individuals as natural in the state of nature, assuming that the instinct for self-preservation and security concerns trigger violence and shape human actions. Consequently, they argue that wars are a result of human nature (Hobbes, 2007, pp. 94-95). Realists, particularly those who argue that the state of nature is anarchic, consider that this condition is also decisive in inter-state relations (Herz, 1981, p. 186). Ultimately, realists accept inter-state relations as a zero-sum game. In this context, realists emphasize that there is no higher authority with the power to limit the actions of states, that actors prioritize power politics, and that states pursue their interests within an anarchic system, using power as a means to this end (Mearsheimer, 2019, p. 16). Realists point out that power politics heightens mutual security concerns and accelerates the arms race. Thus, the security dilemma has led realists to classify issues into high and low politics, with matters related to war, security, and national boundaries being categorized as high politics, while issues such as health, environment, and climate are classified as low politics (Kaufman, 2022, pp. 62-63). Building on this, realists have proposed the maxim "if you want peace, prepare for war" (*si vis pacem, para bellum*) (Henderson, 1997, p. 315). Ultimately, realism considers security as a primary interest for the continuity and survival of states, and treating security as a comprehensive concern encompassing military threats. According to realism, while the need for security is met through the power that states possess, National elements are among the primary interest. Realists also indicate competition in geopolitical and influence struggles, indicating that the ability to compete is proportional to power. Realist and geopolitical theorists, who see physical and military elements as parameters for acquiring power, suggest that power can be calculated using the formula: "military power = military expenditures (0.652) + active military personnel (0.217) + territoriality (0.109)".<sup>5</sup>

Liberals, unlike realists, do not view international relations as a zero-sum game. They emphasize the existence and role of non-state actors alongside states. Therefore, liberals do not view wars as a result of human nature (Kaufman, 2022, p. 62). They assume that low politics issues can also be included in the security equation (Kaufman, 2022, p. 62). In this context, issues such as the economy, environment, climate, and individual security-considered insufficiently emphasized by realists-are evaluated within this framework. Additionally, liberals emphasize that

<sup>4</sup> The high risk of conflict carried by Balkan states, the current conflicts, instability, and governance crises in North Africa, Russia's revisionist foreign policy that continued with the annexation of Crimea following its intervention in Georgia, and the increasing asymmetric threats in the Middle East after the Arab Spring are accepted within this classification.

<sup>5</sup> In the realist paradigm, power calculations are made using similar parameters. Therefore, an empirical method for the calculation model was preferred in this study. For different power calculation formulations, see also (Chang, 2004, p. 5; Sulek, 2020, p. 47).

the increase in the number of democratic states within the system is crucial for achieving global peace and security (Fukuyama, 2012, pp. 22-24). Just as realists, liberals also regard states as rational actors. However, in contrast to realists, they assume that as a result of this rationality, interests can actually be harmonized. Liberals, who assume that non-state actors, particularly international institutions, can reduce states' security concerns, believe that these actors (e.g., the UN, NATO) contribute to global security by addressing misperceptions and resolving conflicts (Nye and Welch, 2011, p. 96). Ultimately, focusing on both military and economic power, liberals propose that economic power can be calculated using the formula: "Economic power = GDP (0.652) × Population (0.217) × Spatial factors/Area (0.109)" (Kiczma and Sufek, 2020, p. 19).

Theories such as pluralism, functionalism, and neo-functionalism, which emphasize the importance of the economy and draw from liberalism, also operate under similar assumptions. These theories argue that economic-based cooperation, which slows down inter-state competition and fosters mutual dependence, will transition into a political phase and eventually manifest as a security community (Haas, 1961, pp. 366-367). Based on this, they assume that through consensus, the process of harmonizing interests and communication, political units will establish a relationship of trust with each other, and thus the security conflict can be put to an end. It is also emphasized that actors can achieve a pluralistic security community by coming together under a supranational authority (Dedeoğlu, 2004, p. 11). In this context, the conceptualizations of Emetai Etzioni's 'take off,' David Mitrany's 'ramification,' and Ernst Haas' 'spill over' offer meaningful propositions about how the EU and security are established (Mitrany, 1948; Haas, 1964).

It is evident that the traditional security approaches outlined above provide rational propositions regarding the scope of security within a bipolar system and contribute to the understanding of security policies. Traditions, security; They see it as a complex mosaic of separate agendas and interests in which each political unit emerges with its own selfish interests, poses its own threats and forms stable alliances (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 253). Moreover, asymmetric threats that emerged after the Cold War began to have global effects, and it became difficult for actors to combat these threats individually. Wars, irregular migration, terrorism, humanitarian crises, and genocides, as well as attacks on historical and cultural heritage, have paved the way for security to expand from a regional to a global scale. As a result, the cost of meeting security needs has increased. In addition, the state, which had the monopoly on the use of force, began to lose this monopoly, and new security areas emerged with the involvement of non-state actors in the process. The expansion of these security domains has paralleled glo-

balization and technological advancements. Areas such as cybersecurity, personal information security, energy supply security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, global pandemics, data security, and combating disinformation have been assessed within the realm of security. Ultimately, the constructivists, who managed to offer consistent propositions in making sense of the actors after 1990 and analyzing the system, tried to clarify the system and the actions of the actors in the triangle of security, perception and identity.

Constructivists, who argue that rationalist theories make assumptions devoid of elements such as culture, language/discourse, religion, and identity, emphasize that interests are not predetermined but are directly related to identity. At the same time, constructivists, who challenge the rationalists' assumption of an anarchic system, focus on the relationship between identity and interests and argue that anarchy is mutually constructed. From this point of view, constructivists, who view the system as a structure that emerges as a result of social relations, defines identity as the distinction between 'us' and 'them,' answering the question of 'who,' providing ideas about areas of interest, and helping to interpret and imply actions" (Hopf, 1998, p. 175; Koslowski and Kratochwil, p. 216). Claiming that concepts such as security dilemma and threat legitimize existing power relations, Wendt (1992, pp. 407-408; 2016, pp. 281-287) states that one of the states has the aim of gaining power, or at least it is accepted as such by the others, and therefore he argues that others also had to "chase for power". Based on this, constructivists assume that actors unable to integrate into a system characterized by high levels of competition have heightened threat perceptions and shape their actions accordingly (Wendt, 1992, p. 407). Constructivists emphasize that the condition for ensuring international security lies in the export of ideas and intercultural dialogues (Snyder, 2004, p. 26). Indeed, in the constructivist perspective focused on discourse, it is highlighted that both material and discursive power are necessary for understanding global events in any meaningful way (Hopf, 1998, p. 177). Indeed, Onuf (2010, p. 68) emphasizes that discourse is not merely a reflection of social reality but also reflects the perspectives of those who use the language.

With the proposition that identities construct interests, constructivists approach power from a different perspective on the grounds that the international system has changed. Constructivists, who evaluate the rationalists' definitions of power as hard power, draw attention to the parameters of soft power. Soft power is defined as "the ability of actors to persuade and attract one another to make others want what they want" (Nye and Welch, 2011, pp. 64-65). Soft power, which provides benefits in a longer period of time compared to hard power gains, is less risky and costly than hard power. However, it should



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be noted that hard and soft power are not independent of each other.

The Copenhagen School, which carried the concept of security beyond the state monopoly, became the trigger for new security studies. As a matter of fact, the School includes areas other than military and physical security elements within the scope of securitization. According to this perspective, nourished by constructivism, "security issues are constructed as security threats through speech-acts, and extraordinary means are used against the constructed security threats" (Baysal and Lüleci, 2015, p. 63).

The Copenhagen School, which highlights the discourse, defines "moving it into the field of security and turning it into a security problem" as "securitization", and taking a problem out of the field of security is defined as "de-security" (Köksoy and Ceyhan, 2023, p. 778). However, Buzan and Wæver (2009, pp. 255-257), who state that actors use and instrumentalize the concept of securitization in line with their own interests, focus on securitization with micro, medium and macro level analysis. Based on this, it is assumed that political units will act as a "constellation" with macro securitization, and attention is drawn to the intersubjective perception of threat. Ultimately, macro securitization is sometimes exclusive and sometimes inclusive, and can reveal a collective or global understanding of security (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 264).

In summary, the area covered by the traditional security approach has been shaped according to the nature, variability and needs of the international system. With the end of the bipolar system, there was a transition to a unipolar and then a multipolar system. This situation has made it necessary to reconsider and review the concept of security and expand the areas it covers. For this reason, modern security approaches were used to test and test the basic assumption of the study. It is assumed that the identity-interest relationship is decisive in Türkiye-EU relations.

### Exclusion of Türkiye from European Security

Türkiye is a member of significant European security institutions, including the OSCE, the WEU, and NATO. It seems that Türkiye, which contributes to EU security especially with its OSCE and NATO membership, has been excluded along with the WEU's integration process into the EU. As a matter of fact, in Bonn, "the condition of full membership to the EU was introduced in order to become a full member of the WEU" (Efe, 2007, p. 130). In this case, Türkiye, Norway and Iceland, which are not EU members, joined the WEU as associate members in 1992 (Akgül and Dizdaroğlu, 2014, p. 140). Within the framework of ESDP, it has brought to the agenda discussions about the current status and duties of states that are

NATO members but not EU members. In this direction, with the Feira Summit held in 2000, "necessary arrangements were made for NATO allies (Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Norway, Iceland, Türkiye) and candidate countries to participate in crisis management operations carried out by the EU" (Akgül and Dizdaroğlu, 2014, p. 146).

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After the AK Party came to power in 2002, there were important developments in the course of EU-Türkiye relations until 2010. Türkiye initiated reforms primarily in the constitutional, economic, political, and judicial spheres to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, which are considered essential for EU membership. However, relations became strained again with the full EU membership of RASC in 2004. The EU presented the recognition of RASC as a prerequisite for Türkiye's membership in the Union. This situation led to a stalemate in relations. The stalled relations were pulled into a pragmatic framework due to migration and refugee issues that threatened EU security, resulting in the signing of the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement in 2013 (Şehitoğlu, 2024, pp. 109-111). However, Türkiye argued that the EU had not fulfilled its commitments. On the other hand, the EU claimed that Türkiye was instrumentalizing the migration crisis. The strained relations peaked with the July 15 coup, and due to national security concerns, Türkiye's fight against PKK and YPG terrorist organizations, especially FETO (Fethullah Terrorist Organization, PDY), was interpreted differently by the EU. Extending the period of state of emergency within the scope of the fight against FETO was evaluated as a human rights violation, and Türkiye was requested to fulfill its responsibilities determined in the

Visa Liberalization Road Map (Türkiye 2016 Report, p. 5). The EU also demanded that Türkiye expand its Customs Union practices to include the Republic of Cyprus.

Within the scope of CFSP, the EU has added a new dimension to Türkiye relations with the 2016 Global Strategy Document. In this regard, the EU, which has determined a new security area, especially the Western Balkans, Africa and the Middle East, based on cooperation against regional crises and the threats it perceives from the south and east, aims to prioritize human rights with Türkiye and develop cooperation in the fight against terrorism (CoE, 2016, p. 22). In the same document, it is implied that it is not possible to exclude Türkiye in the fight against migration, energy supply security, terrorism and organized crime. Türkiye's candidate status was not mentioned and it was noted that relations would be maintained within the framework of good neighborliness (CoE, 2016, p. 24). Likewise the EU has announced that it aims to deepen its relations with Türkiye in the fields of energy, education and transportation. Moreover, it was stated that Türkiye needed to normalize its position on Cyprus for its accession to the EU. It has been suggested that relations with Türkiye can be developed through the Customs Union and visa liberalization (CoE, 2016, p. 35). As a matter of fact, in the 2019 Report prepared within the scope of the Global Strategy Document, the EU announced that a successful cooperation has been established with Türkiye to address common challenges in areas such as migration, fight against terrorism, energy, transportation, economy and trade. It is mentioned that good relations have been established with Türkiye regarding the Middle East Peace Process and the common foreign policy, especially the problems experienced in Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya and the Gulf countries (EUGS 2019 Report, 2019, p. 18). The same report noted that Türkiye had achieved a 44% alignment with the Global Strategy for the European Union, but criticized Türkiye for supporting Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in April 2016 (Türkiye 2016 Raporu, p. 91). In the EU 2018 Report, it is stated that Türkiye has complied with the CFSP at a rate of 16%. In other reports, Türkiye's compliance with the CFSP was reported as 18% in 2019, 21% in 2020, 14% in 2021, and declined to the lowest level ever recorded at 7% in 2022. There are two main factors contributing to the decline in these compliance rates. The first is Türkiye's use of its veto power against Sweden and Finland's NATO membership due to their hosting of terrorist and extremist groups. The second one arises from the problems related to the activities of Greece and RASC in the Mediterranean that violate Türkiye's sovereign rights. As a matter of fact, in the Strategic Compass Reports adopted in 2022, the natural rights of Türkiye, which has the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, were ignored, the theses of Greece and RASC

were brought to the fore, and it was assumed that "the borders of these two countries are the borders of the Union" (Strategic Compass for Security and Defense, 2022, p. 4; Ceylan and İldem, 2022, p. 6).

Türkiye conducts extraterritorial operations on matters concerning its national security; Being physically present in Syria, Iraq and Libya and pursuing its own interests in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) area in the Mediterranean; makes Türkiye's exclusion from CFSP more obvious. Particularly the attitude of France and Greece against Türkiye within the EU caused this situation to be further reinforced and caused Türkiye to be described as a partner rather than a candidate in the Strategic Compass in March 2022. Türkiye has not been directly named as a security consuming actor, but it has been stated that it poses a threat to EU member states. It is stated that Türkiye "engages in provocations and unilateral actions against EU members, violates sovereign rights in violation of international law, instrumentalizes irregular migration, and escalates tension in the Eastern Mediterranean" (Strategic Compass for Security and Defense, 2022, p. 9). Ultimately, it was also noted in the Strategic Compass that the EU is willing to establish a mutually beneficial partnership relationship with Türkiye, continuing its cooperation within the scope of CFSP.

Türkiye's application to Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); despite being excluded from the CFSP, it shows its efforts to develop and deepen bilateral relations. However, associating the problems with identity in the case of Greece and RASC reduces Türkiye's compliance with the CFSP and causes tensions in relations with the EU. The context in which Türkiye-PESCO relations will be developed has not yet gone beyond discussions. In this regard, the fundamental interests of the Union members disrupt the EU's ambition to become a global actor. As a matter of fact, Türkiye's CFSP concerns continue. In this regard, Türkiye continues to display an opposing attitude to the Berlin Plus regulations in EU-NATO relations. At the same time, Türkiye continues to make efforts to ensure that the Berlin Plus arrangement does not include all Union members in EU-NATO relations.

### **Türkiye as a Security Producing Actor: Sample Cases**

Türkiye has contributed and continues to contribute to European security in the context of its state identity and the foreign policy principles it adopted after the Cold War. Although the discourse of 'an actor consuming security' came to the fore in Türkiye-EU relations after the Cold War, Türkiye managed to play a role as a problem-solving actor in the humanitarian crises in Yugoslavia. With the same perspective, Türkiye acted together with the West in the Gulf crisis and played a role in building regional security.

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Based on this, Türkiye has reduced traditional security perceptions after 2002 and evaluated security in a wide range at global and regional levels, as expressed in contemporary security studies. After 2019, Türkiye adopted a humanitarian and multi-dimensional foreign policy principle by focusing on multilateralism, and pursued a foreign policy with the identity of a benevolent power that embraces regional problems.

Türkiye had to struggle with identity crisis, crises and loneliness syndrome after the Cold War, was accepted as a regional power as of 2000. With advancements in power and capacity<sup>6</sup> Türkiye's interest in international politics and regional issues has increased (Morgenthau, 1970, p. 31) emphasizing that it is a European country (Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019).

In this regard, while discussions on recognizing the independence of Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia continue within the European Community (EC), Türkiye has decided to recognize these states. At the same time, Türkiye made special efforts for the integration of the Balkan states into international institutions and organizations. It has revised its regional and global relations with initiatives such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency and D8. Türkiye, which attaches importance to its bilateral relations with Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, which have transitioned from a communist state identity to a liberal state identity, has developed cooperation in military, commercial and infrastructure fields.

Türkiye deployed 1,400 troops to UN Protection Force, participated in Operation Alba, and played an active role in the formation of the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) (Bağbaşıoğlu, 2018, p. 233). Türkiye provided support with a force of 1,320 personnel to the Implementation Force, which was established to ensure the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bağbaşıoğlu, 2018, p. 233; Aydın, 2018, p. 498). Similarly, Türkiye contributed to peace and stability by supporting the Southeastern European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) and the Stability Pact for the Balkans.

Türkiye's contribution to European security in this process was interpreted differently by France, especially Greece. So much so that Greece claimed that Türkiye was trying to create a "Turkish Crescent/Axis" in the Balkans (Aydın, 2018, p. 515; Uzgel, 1998, p. 416). These allegations formed the basis of the problems that Türkiye and EC relations will experience in the future. This situation was used as an argument by Greece and RASC to exclude Türkiye from ESDP. However, despite these allegations, Tür-

kiye continued to contribute to peace and stability and managed to take an active role in the Kosovo crisis that broke out in 1998. When the events that started in Pristina turned into a conflict, Türkiye quickly assumed a mediating role, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the time, İsmail Cem, visited Serbia and presented a 3-stage plan (Uzgel, 1998, p. 412). Later, Türkiye participated in the UN Security Council's embargo on Serbia, opened its airspace to NATO operations, and then provided support to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) with a force of 1,000 persons (Aydın, 2018, pp. 512-513).

The conflict in Kosovo spilled over into Macedonia in 2001, creating a new crisis in the Balkans. In this crisis, as in others, Türkiye acted together with NATO. The EU, which aims to be an operational actor in crises and conflicts within the scope of ESDP, remained in the shadow of NATO in this crisis, while NATO and Türkiye assumed the necessary responsibilities for the establishment of European security. Ultimately, the Albanian and Macedonian conflict ended with the Ohrid Framework Agreement signed in 2001. In this regard, Türkiye participated in NATO's Allied Harmony and Amber Fox operations and supported the Concordia and Proxima operations launched for post-conflict peacekeeping. In addition, Türkiye has contributed to peacekeeping operations outside Europe. As a matter of fact, Türkiye led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) launched in 2003, participated in the Iraq Training Mission initiated by NATO, and trained Iraqi security forces in Türkiye. Similarly, Türkiye participated in Operation Active Endeavor launched by NATO, Operations Ocean Shield in 2009 and Joint Protector in 2010 (Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012).

In 2011, Türkiye participated in the EUFOR Althea Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU's first civilian crisis management operation, as the country that provided the largest military contribution from outside the Union (Türkiye 2021 Report, p. 92). In addition, Türkiye participated in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Police Mission (EUPM) and the EUPOL Kinshasa Police Mission initiated by the EU. However, after the coup on July 15, Türkiye had to temporarily withdraw from the military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EULEX in Kosovo (Türkiye 2016 Report, p. 31). In addition, Türkiye temporarily contributed to the Palestine EUPOL COPPS and Ukraine EUAM Operations initiated by the Union outside Europe (Türkiye 2016 Report, p. 92).

Türkiye addressed the problems that emerged after the Arab Spring from a humanitarian perspective and contributed to European security. After the Arab Spring, the EU needed Türkiye more than ever. So much so that European Commission President Je-

<sup>6</sup> According to Morgenthau (1970, pp. 31-32), an actor's global relations correspond to its power. The disinterest of countries like Luxembourg, Switzerland, or Andorra in international politics stems from this assumption.

an-Claude Juncker stated that “the EU should work together with Türkiye and develop policies in accepting and monitoring refugees” (Gözkaman, 2013, pp. 110-116). Türkiye has acted together with the international community in humanitarian, refugee and migration crises, especially energy supply security. At the same time, Türkiye has become a role model for these revolutionary movements with its democratic and liberal identity. In this regard, it organized an international conference titled “Arab Awakening and Peace in the Middle East: Muslim and Christian Perspectives” in Istanbul in 2012 (DİB, 2012). He contributed to NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Libya and supported popular movements to reach a democratic, human rights-prioritizing and liberal structure.

Türkiye took the initiative in the irregular migration flow that caused a crisis in the EU with the Readmission Agreement in 2013. In this regard, Türkiye supported the EU’s Valletta Action Plan, which aims to prevent irregular migration flows from Africa to Europe. With this contribution of Türkiye, “the number of immigrants entering the EU, whose number exceeded 1 million in 2015, decreased to 123 thousand in 2019” (Boell, 2021). Since 2016, Türkiye continues to contribute to the protection and security of the Union’s air, sea and land borders in the context of the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). However, Greece pushed the refugees back and Frontex officials ignored this situation in their reports; It jeopardized the cooperation process that had been developed. As a matter of fact, in European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigation initiated by the EU within the scope of the fight against corruption, it was stated that “Frontex officials abused their duties and turned a blind eye to human rights violations” (Euronews, 2022). Ultimately, Türkiye, as a country on the irregular migration route, has become the country hosting the highest number of refugees today (UNHCR, 2023). In this regard, considering that the main target geography of the migration route is Europe, Türkiye has contributed to EU security by preventing a significant crisis.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU swiftly announced the adoption of the Strategic Compass Document in March 2022. In parallel with the onset of the invasion, the EU condemned Russia and began to impose sanctions. The diplomatic initiatives initiated by the EU before the war failed. For this reason, while the war continued, it adopted a policy far from being a mediator and problem-solving actor (Şehitoğlu, 2023, pp. 239-241). As a matter of fact, the EU, which provided economic and political support to Ukraine with the start of the war, also extended its aid to military areas as the war continued. Türkiye, on the other hand, condemned Russia’s invasion at almost every opportunity, but believed

that the problems would be solved through proactive diplomacy and negotiations rather than sanctions. This approach by Türkiye faced criticism for not participating in the sanctions. However, Türkiye hosted the Antalya Summit in March 2022, where the parties had high-level contact for the first time after the invasion, and prioritized dialogues to resolve the crisis. The food crisis that emerged after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had an impact on other geographical subsystems, especially Africa, and Türkiye brought together Russian and Ukrainian officials in Istanbul on July 22, 2022 and pioneered the launch of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (UN, 2022).

Türkiye, with its identity as a problem solver and playmaker, has also played a critical role in solving the energy crisis experienced by the EU. The EU, which is 27% unilaterally dependent on Russia for energy, has tried to overcome this problem with the REPowerEU Plan. Through the REPowerEU Plan, the EU aimed to reduce its dependence on Russian gas by 2/3 (Euronews, 2022). Ultimately, Eurasian and Middle Eastern energy resources have become increasingly important for the EU. As a result, Türkiye has come to the fore as the least costly and most reliable route for energy transportation, and the need for Türkiye to transport energy resources to Europe has increased.

Türkiye also contributes to global energy security with the “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), South Caucasus (SCP), Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE), Türkiye-Greece Natural Gas Interconnection, Trans Anatolia (TANAP) and Turkish Stream” pipelines presented. At the same time, Türkiye continues to meet Europe’s energy needs with the Southern Gas Corridor completed in 2020. As a matter of fact, with these initiatives, Türkiye supplied 11.3 billion m<sup>3</sup> of gas to the EU in 2022, and this figure reached 97.3 billion m<sup>3</sup> in 2023; It has also contributed to European security in the field of energy (Anadolu Agency, 2023).

It is seen that Türkiye’s capacity in the context of military, geopolitical, economic and soft power has improved in line with its current position and foreign policy goals. Analysis shows that this capacity will increase and the competitiveness level will increase in 2030. In this regard, increasing asymmetric threats and regional instability; It has caused Türkiye to care about defense expenditures and military developments, also turning to tools that will increase its soft power capacity. As a matter of fact, it is predicted that Türkiye will rank 15th in the global military power ranking in 2030. Türkiye, which ranked 18th in 1992 and 17th in 2018 in the economic power rankings, is assumed to be 15th in 2030 (Kiczma and Sułek, 2020). In the soft power ranking, Türkiye, which was ranked 30th in 2020 and 27th in 2021, rose to 23rd place in 2023 (Brand Finance Brandirectory, 2020-2021-2022).



## Türkiye-European Union Relations In The Framework Of Common Foreign and Security Policy: Identity and Security

Table 1. Power Indicators

		Military Power 2030 (Foreseen)			Economic Power 2030 (Foreseen)			Soft Power 2023
1.	Chinese	201,94	1.	Chinese	201,94	1.	USA	74,8
2.	USA	137,99	2.	USA	137,99	2.	U.Kingdom	67,3
7.	Russia	24,82	7.	Russia	24,82	3.	Germany	65,3
8.	Germany	23,06	8.	Germany	23,06	6.	France	62,4
10.	France	19,32	10.	France	19,32	9.	Italy	56,6
11.	U.Kingdom	18,86	11.	U.Kingdom	18,86	13.	Russia	54,8
14.	Italy	14,12	14.	Italy	14,12	16.	Holland	53,7
15.	Türkiye	14,03	15.	Türkiye	14,03	20.	Belgium	51,2
16.	Spain	12,50	16.	Spain	12,50	23.	Türkiye	50,4

Source: (Kiczma ve Sulek, 2020, ss. 20-74; Brand Finance, 2022)

As can be seen in the table above, Türkiye has similar values to the main EU member powers. Considering these indicators, it can be seen that Türkiye stands out as a stable center in its region in the geopolitical context. This situation makes Türkiye attractive for cooperation in security crises. At the same time, Türkiye is gaining functionality as a natural line of defense for European security in the context of power and capacity.

### Conclusion

It seems that the EU and Türkiye, which were in the same camp during the Cold War, face similar threats with the end of the bipolar system. Although the perceived threats specific to the Eastern Bloc have ended, securitization and the expansion of the scope of security have led to the emergence of new areas of cooperation for the two actors. In the initial phase, this cooperation is seen to have emerged in the context of the conflicts in the Balkans. As a matter of fact, with the dissolution of Yugoslavia; It has put the security of both Türkiye and Europe at risk. Both actors tried to follow an active policy in solving the problem. Türkiye and the EU, affected by the humanitarian and migration crisis caused by these wars, took part in mediation activities to end the conflicts. At the same time, the support that Türkiye and the EU provide to NATO and UN operations stems from the fact that they have similar identity cores and common interests. The liberal and democratic structures of the two actors make it easier for them to establish a security relationship in line with common interests and contribute to the harmonization of interests.

Türkiye managed to emerge from the Cold War as a

regional power. It contributed to European security with its increasing power and capacity. However, it seems that the nationalism that has erupted again within the EU as European identity comes to the fore has a negative impact on Türkiye. Islamophobic approaches, especially those developed in Sweden, France, Greece and RASC, have paved the way for Türkiye to be perceived as the other in terms of both security and politics. In this regard, Türkiye's multifaceted foreign policy has sometimes been called Neo-Ottomanist and expansionist, and sometimes interpreted as an axis shift. In contrast, Türkiye's humanitarian approach to the migration crisis caused by the Syrian civil war, its problem-solving actor initiative in the food and energy crisis that started with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the vaccine it produced against the Coronavirus epidemic and its mediation in disputes in the Balkans; contributed to European security.

Türkiye continues to contribute to global and regional security by pursuing an active foreign policy in the Caucasus and North Africa. The bilateral problems with Greece and RASC were reflected in the relations between the Union and Türkiye, and Türkiye's security concerns were indirectly included in the EU official documents.

Irregular migrations that emerged after the Arab Spring and the economic, social and security problems caused by these migrations; It has also led to an increase in the number of EU civilian operations. The global economic recession caused by the coronavirus epidemic, reverse globalization, and the overriding of nation-state interests over the interests of the Union have negatively affected the sustainability of the CFSP. At the same time, waves of irregular migration occurring at the EU borders, the threat

perceived by the EU from the Lukeshenko regime in Belarus and Russia's invasion of Ukraine; It has increased the importance of environment and climate, global epidemic, food and energy supply security issues. These crises also threatened European security. For these reasons, the need for Türkiye as an actor that produces security in resolving crises and disputes has increased. Türkiye has contributed to European security in this context. As a matter of fact, after these contributions, while 1 million people immigrated to the EU in 2015, this number decreased to 123 thousand in 2019. Similarly, Türkiye played an important role in reducing the EU's dependence on Russian energy resources. Türkiye, which supplied 11.3 billion m<sup>3</sup> of gas to the EU before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, will supply 97.3 billion m<sup>3</sup> of gas in 2023; It helped the EU achieve its goal of reducing its energy dependence on Russia by 2/3. At the same time, Türkiye, which assumed responsibility for the food crisis that broke out with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, also contributed to global security by leading the launch of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Ultimately, Türkiye's attitude towards sample cases and current threats; It reveals that it is not a security-consuming actor as implied in the 2022 Strategic Compass, including the 2008 and 2016 Strategy Documents. Therefore, this situation shows that Türkiye contributes to European and global security.

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